We examine the role of demographics and changing industrial policies in accounting for the rapid rise in household savings and in per capita output growth in China since the mid-1970s. The demographic changes come from reductions in the fertility rate and increases in the life expectancy, while the industrial policies take many forms. These policies cause important structural changes; first benefiting private labor-intensive firms by incentivizing them to increase their share of employment, and later on benefiting capital-intensive firms resulting in an increasing share of capital devoted to heavy industries. We conduct our analysis in a general equilibrium economy that also features endogenous human capital investment. We calibrate the model to match key economic variables of the Chinese economy and show that demographic changes and industrial policies both contributed to increases in savings and output growth but with differing intensities and at different horizons. We further demonstrate the importance of endogenous human capital investment in accounting for the economic growth in China.
Introduction
The Chinese economy has been growing rapidly over the last few decades. In 1980, per capita GDP in China was about 5 percent of that of the U.S. By 2012, the ratio had shot up to over 20 percent (Figure 1 panel a) . In the meantime, the Chinese economy has undergone substantial structural changes. Over time, private firms have accounted for an increasing share of total employment. Additionally, the share of the capital stock in the capital-intensive industries relative to that in the labor-intensive industries has been trending up in recent years (Figure 1 panel b) . Researchers have attributed these structural changes to government industrial policies. Specifically, a hallmark of the early industrial policy that began in the 1980s is the reduction of financial frictions that privately owned enterprises in the labor-intensive sector had endured.
1 Starting in the mid-1990s, the government started implementing preferential credit policies that favored firms in the capital-intensive sector.
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On the household side, China is aging rapidly due to declines in the fertility rate and increases in the life expectancy (Figure 2 panel a). The decline in the fertility rate started in the late 1960s but was exacerbated by the one-child policy enacted in 1979.
The policy was intended to curb the population growth that the Mao-era pro-natality agenda had precipitated. 3 As a result of these changes, the young-age-dependency ratio, the ratio of people under the age of 15 to the population between 15 and 65, has declined significantly, from a high of 70 percent in 1975 to a low of 22 percent in 2012 ( Figure 2 panel b).
In this paper, we build a unified growth model to capture all three aspects of the Chinese economy: the rapid output growth, the structural changes on the firm side, and the aging population. Households and firms interact through savings and investment decisions, as well as through labor supply and demand along both the quantity and quality margins. The model economy consists of three sectors: two intermediate goods sectors, one labor intensive and the other capital intensive, and one final goods sector. 2 See Chang, Chen, Waggoner, and Zha (2015), and Bai, Lu, and Tian (2018). 3 The Chinese government started to promote family planning as an effort to curb population growth in 1971. The tactics included initiatives that encouraged postponing marriage until a later age, lengthening birth spacing between children, and reducing their number. In the late 1970s, the government adopted a stricter approach and began imposing a limit on the number of children per couple: a two children limit implemented nationwide in 1978 followed by the one-child policy announced in 1979 and strictly enforced in urban areas after 1980 (Choukhmane, Coeurdacier, and Jin 2017).
The two intermediate goods sectors take capital and labor as their inputs but differ in capital intensity used in production. To capture the structural reforms of the 1980s, we allow for two types of firms in the labor-intensive sector, the state-owned firms and the private firms. While the state-owned firms are less productive than the private firms, they have access to cheaper credit. A final goods producing sector combines these intermediate goods into final goods that can be consumed or invested.
On the household side, the economy is depicted by an overlapping-generation model in which parents and children are connected by inter-vivos transfer. Specifically, households cannot borrow and they save for old age. We model the fertility decision exogenously. However, human capital investment is an important choice variable in the model. 4 While elementary and middle school education is mandatory, high school education and beyond is optional and determined by the parents. Grown children make transfer payments to their parents during the parents' old age and the payments are proportional to the children's labor earnings. In addition to the transfer payments from their children, retired parents receive a pension from the government. The government finances pensions through a wage tax and finances subsidies to firms through an income tax that applies to both labor income and pension income.
We use our model to conduct counterfactual exercises illustrating the contributions of these various channels to growth in output as well as in household savings. 5 We calibrate our parameters to match key aspects of the Chinese economy in the mid-1970s. Then we reduce the fertility rate, lengthen the life expectancy, and cut the retirement pension to match their data counterparts. Credit subsidies are chosen to match changes in employment shares by private firms and the ratio of assets in heavy industries relative to assets in light industries.
Our model matches aggregate output growth and the households savings rate between 1980 and 2012 reasonably well. All changes on the household side, the lower fertility rate, the lengthened life expectancy, and the reduction in pensions lead households to save more. Among the three factors, increases in longevity have the largest effect. The higher savings rate as well as the decline in the working age population affect firms and benefit the capital-intensive sector disproportionately. The same demographic changes, on the other hand, also encourage households to invest more in their children's human capital because these transfer payments from children serve as an annuity in their old age. The resulting higher human capital leads to a more productive labor force and hence an increase in labor supply, which benefits the labor-intensive sector disproportionately.
Thus, both higher savings and increased labor quality lead to higher output growth while the reduced quantity of labor restricts growth. Changing government subsidies initially benefit private firms in the labor-intensive sector as taxes on their credit are cut. This policy raises wages, which further encourages human capital investment. The analyses are generally conducted either in a partial equilibrium framework with the wage and/or interest rate given exogenously or in an environment that has largely ignored the complexity of the evolution of production. Our paper contributes to this literature by adding rich firm dynamics and changing government credit policies, although we do not model precautionary motives. The modeling of the new credit policy is important as it helps account for the capital accumulation observed in more recent times. Furthermore, we add a detailed household sector to the model that complements those in Imrohoroglu and Zhao (2018b), yet differs in that we allow for endogenous human capital accumulation, which serves as an additional link between the household sector and the firms. We consider an overlapping-generation model where households are connected through inter-vivo transfers. Production takes place in two industries, the capital-intensive industry and the labor-intensive industry. While the capital-intensive industry consists entirely of state-owned firms, the labor-intensive industry contains both state-owned and private firms. The government pays for government policies and the pay-as-you-go social security system through labor income taxes.
Households
In each period t, a generation of households is born with human capital h. We assume that h grows at an exogenous rate of g y . We denote a household's birth cohort by B.
We thus have j = t − B, where j is the age of the household. A household begins to work at age j 1 . It exits the economy at age J B with a certain life span of J B . The household gives birth to n B (n B > 0) children at age j f and retires at age j r , where
At each age, the household makes consumption and savings decisions.
When its children are between the age of 16 and 22, the household also makes human capital investment decisions for them. Labor supply is inelastic. Starting from retirement age j r , the household also receives transfers from its children at which point the children would be j r − j f years of age and we assume that j f + j 1 ≤ j r to ensure that when the household retires, its children have already entered the economy. Additionally, the household receives a social security/pension which is a fraction ς B of its earnings at the time of retirement. The demographic structure of our model endogenously determines population growth rate, g t . We omit time t subscripts or the cohort B subscript in our description of the household's problem below.
Labor income is subject to a payroll tax τ ss with the revenue going towards pensions.
Labor income as well as social security income are subject to an additional tax τ, which is used to fund government credit subsidizing policies.
We denote the consumption of an age-j household by c j , savings by a j , and children's human capital by h c,j . The period utility function of a household of age j is
where σ is the relative risk aversion parameter.
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Labor productivity is deterministic and age dependent with all workers of the same age j facing the same exogenous profile e j . Given the household's human capital h, the total productivity of the household is given by he j . We impose an exogenous borrowing constraint: At any given period the household's financial asset must satisfy a j ≥0.
We assume that a household spends a fraction Φ 1 of its wage income on each child's consumption until their children turn j 1 years of age. Children start receiving education at age 7. The first 9 years of education is mandatory and each child's education costs a fraction Φ 2 of the household's wage income. The next 7 years' education is optional and the level of investment i h is chosen by the household (in terms of final goods).
We assume the human capital production function follows
, where 0 ≤ κ ≤ 1, and the parameter η j−j f governs the child-age dependent efficiency in human capital accumulation. This functional form is a slight modification of that used in Manuelli and Seshadri (2014) . The transfer to the household's parents is a fraction
B,s of the wage income, where n B,s is the number of siblings the household has. We assume 0 ≤ µ 1 ≤ 1 to capture the decline of each child's transfer to parents with the number of siblings. 
Recursive Problems
Because we allow some parameters to vary by cohort, and also because during the transition path, wages, interest rates, and taxes differ over time, households at the same age but from different cohorts solve different problems. To summarize, a household's state space consists of its cohort B, age j, human capital h, and children's human capital h c .
8 Table 1 describes a household's decisions at different ages. Define a household's after-tax labor income and pension
That is, a household receives wage earnings before retirement and a pension after retirement. Note the pension is taxed at rate τ , labor income is taxed at rate τ + τ ss . let the symbol r d represent the net deposit rate the household faces. The household then solves the following problem, 1. j 1 ≤ j < j f + 7: the household either does not have children or has children under the age of 7 who do not require formal education yet;
The first term in the value function is the standard power period utility function.
The parameter β is the discount factor. The left hand side of the budget constraint includes consumption, savings, basic living expense for the children, and the transfer the household makes to its parent when the parent is j r years of age or older and hasn't exited the economy yet. 9 The right hand side of the budget constraint contains the household's asset plus interest income and after tax labor income.
2. j f + 7 ≤ j < j f + 16: the household has children that must receive mandatory primary as well as middle school education;
Relative to households in the first age group, the household now needs to pay for its children's mandatory education captured by the fourth term in the budget constraint.
3. j f + 16 ≤ j < j f + j 1 : the household has children who are eligible for optional high 9 Since a parent gives birth at age j f , an individual of age j has a parent of age j + j f .
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school as well as college education;
The household now makes human capital investment decisions for its children, and the associated expenditure is captured by the fourth term in the budget constraint ni h . The law of motion for the children's human capital is represented by equation (5), which combines the children's existing human capital with that of investment in a Cobb-Douglas functional form. As discussed earlier, η j−j f denotes efficiency in human capital accumulation, which is a function of the children's age.
the household no longer has school-age children;
At this age group, as in age groups 1 and 2, the household makes only consumption and savings decisions. Its children have left the household and no longer cost anything. The household starts receiving transfer payments from the children after retirement as captured by the last term on the right hand side of the budget constraint.
The Firms
The It also captures important features of the Chinese economy: that the privatization of state-owned enterprises has been concentrated mostly in the labor-intensive sector; and the capital-intensive sector is dominated by state-owned enterprises that enjoy heavy subsidies from the government.
The Final Goods Sector
Following Chang et al. (2015), we denote final goods at time t by Y t . It is a CES aggregate of the two intermediate goods:
The subscripts k and l stand for capital-and labor-intensive intermediate goods, respectively, and γ denotes the elasticity of substitution between the two intermediate goods.
We normalize the price of the final goods to be 1, and use P k,t to denote the price of the capital-intensive intermediate goods, and P l,t the price of the labor-intensive intermediate goods. The firm's optimization problem implies
The zero-profit condition for the final good further implies
The Capital-Intensive Intermediate Goods Sector
Motivated by the empirical evidence documented in, among others, Chang et al. (2015),
we assume that the capital-intensive sector is populated entirely by state-subsidized enterprises. The production function takes the following Cobb-Douglas form:
where K k,t and L k,t represent capital rented from households and efficient labor inputs, respectively, and A k,t denotes labor augmented productivity. The parameter α k represents the capital income share in the production of the intermediate goods. The firms in this sector solve the following problem,
where r f,t denotes the gross interest rate that is common to both the capital-intensive and the labor-intensive sectors; S k,t (0 ≤ S k,t < 1) denotes the interest subsidy firms in the capital-intensive sector receive from the government; δ represents the capital depreciation rate, and w t is the wage rate that is also common to both sectors. 10 Profit maximization generates the following two first-order conditions,
Note that we use different notation for the deposit rate and the rate of return to capital, where the difference ξ t = r f,t − r d,t represents an intermediation cost.
The Labor-Intensive Intermediate Goods Sector
We assume that the labor-intensive sector consists of state-owned and privately owned enterprises. We wish to highlight some important differences between the two type of firms. First, state-owned firms are generally weaker in governance and offer fewer incentives to their managers than private firms. Second, compared to private firms, state-owned firms have better access to borrowing because of their close connection with state-owned banks. This second feature also motivated our modeling of the interest rate subsidy that we discussed regarding the capital-intensive firms. Thus, the key differences between these two types of firms are their labor productivity and costs of capital.
We assume that private enterprises have a higher labor productivity and are subject to higher cost of financing capital in the form of a tax, while the state-owned enterprises receive an interest rate subsidy. In order to capture the effects of a changing mix of firms in this sector, we employ an exogenous externality in production along with an operating cost measured in labor hours that is proportional to the number of i type firms in the sector, where i = s, p (s indicates state-owned firms and p indicates private firms). A zero profit condition allows us to pin down the number of firms N l,i,t (i = s, p)
of each type and to endogenize the evolution of the relative share of private and state 10 We assume that the credit subsidy is proportional to the interest rate.
owned firms in this sector.
Let K l,i,j,t and L l,i,j,t (i = s, p, j = 1, 2, ..., N l,i,t ) denote the capital input and labor input, respectively, employed by firm j of type i at time t in the labor-intensive sector.
We assume that firms in each type are symmetric. Let K l,i,t and L l,i,t denote the total capital and labor input, respectively, employed by type i firms, and let K l,t and L l,t denote total capital and labor inputs in the labor-intensive sector at time t. Given the symmetry assumption, we then have
. Additionally,
The production function of firm j of type i in the labor-intensive sector at time t is as follows,
The parameter α l indicates capital income share, γ l indicates labor income share, with 0 < α l + γ l < 1, and A l,i,t indicates labor productivity. Note that the production function includes aggregate capital in the sector K l,t as an additional input, which introduces an externality and is necessary to ensure balanced growth. The higher the total capital used in the sector, the more productive firms are. This setup allows both types of firms to coexist in the labor-intensive sector as the production function, without aggregate capital, exhibits decreasing return to scale. Finally, there is a cost of production,
, which is a function of the wage rate w t , the total labor input L l,i,t , and the number of same type firms N l,i,t in the sector. The term f l,i is a scaling factor.
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We can now write the firm's problem as follows,
where
This particular functional form for production cost allows the cost to grow at the same rate as the wage rate while the total number of firms of the same type does not change and, thus, helps reserve balanced growth at steady state. Additionally, allowing the cost to depend on firm size exponentially ensures that firms receiving financing subsidies are larger when the exponent is positive. Having said that, our model is parsimonious in its modeling of firm sizes. We make no attempt to match the Chinese firm dynamics in this paper.
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negative. The first order conditions from the profit-maximization problem are,
The profit for each firm is then,
In equilibrium, the fixed cost will be such that the profit for each firm is zero, π l,i,j,t = 0.
The Government
The government chooses tax rates and interest subsidies {τ t , τ ss,t , S k,t , S l,s,t , S l,p,t } in this economy. Let Λ j,t denote the measure of households at age j and time t. We then have
Note that B denotes cohort, or the year the household was born, B = t − j.
Equilibrium
The competitive equilibrium consists of prices
.,J ; t=0,..,∞ , and population measure {Λ j,t } j=j 1,..,J ,t=0,..,∞ such that 
(c) Labor market: households supply labor to firms.
4. Government balances budget.
Calibration
We calibrate our initial steady state benchmark to the Chinese economy in the mid1970s, and accordingly the per capita GDP growth rate, g y , to be 2 percent. The per capita GDP growth rate comes from the Penn World Tables where we first divide the output-side real GDP at chained purchasing power parity (PPPs) by population and then take the log difference. The series is subsequently HP filtered with a parameter of 1600. Table 2 presents the parameters and their sources or data moments that we seek to match. We discuss our choices below. For some of the economic indicators that are not available, we use their earliest available statistics, which are typically in the early 1990s and extrapolated back to 1975.
Households
We assume that a household enters the economy at age 23, gives birth to its children at age 25, and retires at age 55. We set the maximum life span to be 57 from World Bank data. We also obtain the population growth rate of 2.45 percent from the World Bank data. The implied births per woman was 3.6 which corresponds to 1.8 per single parent household in our model.
For preferences, we assume a 1.5 relative risk aversion parameter as is standard in the macro literature. The discount rate β is chosen to match the capital-output ratio in 1975. Because our overlapping generations framework abstracts from uncertainties in income, expenditure, and the pension, the model requires a discount factor that is significantly larger than 1 to get close to the observed savings rate. 
Firms
Turning to firms, the capital income share of the capital-intensive and labor-intensive sectors, α k and α l , are calibrated to match the capital income share of the two industries 13 Assuming that households savings rate was 35 percent in 1980, a typical household with 3 children spent 65 percent of its income on consumption. Assuming that a child is equivalent to 0.5 of an adult in terms of consumption expenditure, we estimate an expenditure share of about 18.6 (=0.65/(2+3*0.5))percent of household income per adult or 9.3 percent per child. Our 8 percent number, therefore, serves as a lower bound.
14 To reduce the number of parameters, we estimate the efficiency function as a polynomial of degree 2 with respect to age. 16 The heavy industry sector includes real estate, leasing and commercial service; electricity, heating and water production and supply; coking, coal gas and petroleum processing; wholesale, retail, accommodation and catering; banking and insurance; chemical; mining; transportation, information transmission and computer services and software. The light industry sector includes food, beverage and tobacco; other manufacturing; metal product; machinery equipment; construction material and nonmetallic mineral product; textile, garment and leather; construction; other services; and farming, forestry, animal husbandry and fishery ( 
Government
We normalize the interest subsidy received by the state-owned firms in the labor-intensive sector to zero, but choose the interest subsidy to the private enterprises to match the relative capital output ratio of the state-owned enterprises to private enterprises (2.65).
We set the interest subsidy rate to the capital-intensive sector in 1975 to be zero. As 
Results in the Initial Steady State
In the second and third columns of Table 3 , we present data moments as well as their corresponding model moments. The return to capital and the aggregate capital-to-total output ratio are statistics that the paper is calibrated to match, the other moments are nontargeted moments. Note that in 1980, private enterprises were almost nonexistent. To capture that, we impose a large proportional credit tax that results in a small proportional income tax rebate of 0.1 percent.
Our model does a reasonably good job at matching most of the non-targeted data moments reported here. For example, the young age dependency ratio, defined as those under 15 to the population between the ages of 15 and 65, is close to the data. The social security tax needed to finance the pension payment amounts to 3.3 percent of wage income. This low number arises because in the mid-1970s, households had a life expectancy of only 57 years of age, only 2 years older than the retirement age of 55.
Final Steady State and Transition Dynamics

Final Steady State
We make the following assumptions about the final steady state. A one-parent household expects to live to 80 years of age and bears 0.75 child at age 25. 19 This is the average fertility rate between 2000 and 2010. The corresponding population growth rate is -0.89 percent. The pension replacement rate is assumed to be 20 percent of the households' wage income at retirement. No interest subsidies apply to any industry or any type of firm. We also set intermediation cost to zero.
With these assumptions, we calculate the long run new steady state and report the results in the last column of Though households also invest a substantially larger amount of their income in their children's human capital, the even larger demand for savings leads to a higher capital-tolabor ratio in the final steady state. The higher capital-to-labor ratio pushes up wages and the desire to invest in human capital. However, the longer life span and the decline in the pension replacement rate drive greater savings as well. Finally, despite the low pension replacement rate, the aging of the population requires a higher payroll tax rate to support the new pension system. At 13 percent, the new payroll tax rate is more than 4 times as large as it is in the initial steady state.
Exogenous Processes in Transition
We assume that in 1975 the Chinese economy was in steady state. We then solve the model for the period 1976-2300, assuming that the economy is hit by exogenous changes in fertility, life expectancy, and the pension replacement rate, and changes in interest subsidies and intermediation cost starting from 1976. To compute the transition dynamics, given all the exogenous processes discussed above, we find the equilibrium path with a guess on the sequence of interest rates, wages, prices of the intermediate goods, and government income taxes. Using this guess, we solve consumption, saving, and human capital investment in children for each cohort, and solve the firm's problem each year. We search over the sequences of interest rates, wages, prices of the intermediate goods, and government income taxes until we reach a fixed point. To simplify our computation, the payroll tax rate during transition is calculated each period using the ratio of retiree to working age population. Therefore, the government's pension expense doesn't always break even along the transition path. The remaining revenue, if there is any, is rebated back to the household resulting in a reduction in the labor income tax required so that government breaks even in implementing 21 The Chinese government provided widespread pension coverage before the 1980s. The reforms introduced since then have been incomplete and insufficient. Gu and Vlosky (2008) report that in 2002 and 2005, 40-50 percent of the elderly in cities and more than 90 percent of the elderly in rural areas did not have a pension. According to Song et al. (2014) , and Sin (2005) , the Chinese pension system provided a replacement rate of 60 percent to those retiring between 1997 and 2011 who were covered by the system. As the urban population was less than 40 percent of the Chinese population from 1980-2011, the pension coverage rate is calibrated to be 20 percent of the population. 22 The data only go to 2012 so we extrapolate the processes to be consistent with the final steady state values that occur 200 years in the future.
credit policies.
The payroll tax initially declines due to reduction in the pension replacement rate.
As the population ages, however, the economy needs to support a larger and larger share of elderly resulting in an increasing payroll tax rate, which reaches over 13 percent in the final steady state. The tax rate required to support credit policies peaks in 2020 at 35 percent, which corresponds to the time credit subsidies to capital-intensive industries peak. The small negative rate between 2075 and 2150 comes from the rebate from the pension expenses as discussed above. We don't plot the endogenously determined payroll as well as income tax rates during the transition to save space.
Transitional Dynamics
Household Transitional Dynamics
In Figure 6 panels a and b, we chart the life expectancy and birth rates per adult in the model against their counterparts in the data, respectively. To arrive at this series, we first obtain life expectancy at birth from the World Bank, and then adjust the rate by the mortality rate for those under 5 and the mortality rate for those between 6 and 14. After age 14, we assume the household's survival rate is 100 percent until it reaches the end of its life expectancy. Changes in the birth rates in the data are gradual. This is because the one-child policy was enforced at the provincial level and some provinces have more relaxed restrictions. There were also exceptions to the policy. For instance, families whose first child is disabled were allowed to have a second child. Families in the rural areas were also allowed to have a second child if the first born was a girl. 
Firm Transitional Dynamics
In Figure 7 , we chart model implications against data for the targeted moments on the firm's side including the ratio of output in the capital-intensive sector to the output in the labor-intensive sector, the ratio of capital input in the capital-intensive sector to that in the labor-intensive sector, private firms' employment share in total employment, and the overall capital-output ratio in the economy. The model does a good job fitting these targeted moments. Since the early 1990s, the capital-intensive heavy industry has become increasingly important both in terms of capital input and in terms of total output. Private firms have also become increasingly important. Their share of employment went from near zero in the early 1980s to over 50 percent by 2015. The economywide capital-output ratio has also been trending up during our sample period.
We now turn to the two aggregate series that are of particular interest to us: aggregate savings as a ratio of total output and per capita output growth. Finally, as mentioned earlier, due to the discreet change in life expectancy, the savings rate and per capita output growth exhibit zig-zag patterns. The pattern is particularly evident with per capita output growth.
Decomposing the Savings Rate and the Output Growth Rate
This section provides a decomposition of the impact of demographic changes represented by the one-child policy, the increase in longevity, and the reduction in the pension replacement rate. We also analyze in detail the effects of industrial policy changes characterized by credit subsidies to different industries and different enterprises in shaping the time-series path of the aggregate savings rate as well as the per capita output growth rate. We do this by running a sequence of counterfactual experiments where we allow demographic changes or industrial policy changes one by one. The interest rate, wage 22 rate, and relative prices are solved in the general equilibrium. The payroll tax rate is calculated as discussed above, that is, using the fraction of retirees. The income tax rate together with any possible rebate from the payroll tax revenue or shortfalls funds government credit subsidies.
The Role of Demographic Changes
In Figure 9 , we investigate the role demographics play in shaping the time path of the aggregate savings rate and the per capita output growth rate absent of any change in credit policies. In panels a and b, we allow for only increased longevity. In panels c and d, we also introduce a gradual reduction in the pension replacement rate in addition to the increased longevity. Finally in panels e and f, we include a reduction in fertility completing the analysis of all the changes in demographics. After that, as deposit rates begin to decline, and as households begin to invest more in their children's education, the aggregate savings rate starts to decline very gradually (Figure 9 panel a) . Adding reductions in the replacement rate increases the time path of the savings rate. Specifically, in 2000, it raises the savings rate by about 1 percentage point to 30 percent. By 2020, the rate is increased by nearly 3 percentage points ( Figure   9 panel c). The implementation of the one-child policy does not have any material impact on the savings rate (Figure 9 panel e) . On the contrary, it actually decreases savings in the long run. This result arises because with fewer children, households find it more worthwhile to invest in their children's human capital in order to increase their old age transfer from the children.
Turning to the effects of demographic changes on per capita output growth as depicted in the right panels of Figure 9 , increased longevity raises the per capita output growth rate substantially, but only after the mid-1990s (Figure 9 panel b) . Given that the retirement age is kept at 55, the growth comes mostly from capital deepening as households need to save more for retirement given their longer life span. The reduced replacement rate raises the growth rate after the 1990s but only slightly (Figure 9 panel   d) . The reduced fertility rate raises the growth path in both the short run and the long run. The additional growth in the short run is largely mechanical as the fraction of young falls and a greater percent of the population is working. In the medium to longer term, per capita output growth further benefits from the supply of skilled labor as human capital investment rises in concert with the lower fertility rate (Figure 9 panel f).
The Role of Industrial Policies
In this subsection, we investigate how credit policies and changes in intermediation cost help shape the time path of the aggregate savings rate as well as per capita output growth. The results are presented in Figure 10 . We conduct four experiments here.
First, we reduce the tax on credit to private firms in the labor-intensive sector. We present the results in panels a and b. Then we give subsidies to the entire labor-intensive sector. This includes the reduction in the credit tax on private labor-intensive firms and the initial increase and then decline in the credit subsidies to state-owned labor-intensive firms as described in Figure 5 With the reduction in credit taxes on the private firms in the labor-intensive industry, the demand for labor and capital both rise, but more so for labor due to its higher use in the labor-intensive industry. This leads to a rise in wage and, hence, a rise in hosueholds' desire to invest in their children's human capital. As a result, savings fall albeit very slightly (panel a). When the government gives subsidies to the state-owned firms in the labor-intensive sector, the short-run decline in the savings rate is reversed (panel c of Figure 5 ). This is due to lower productivity from these state-owned firms which shifts production to the now more productive capital-intensive sector and, hence, drives up the interest rate. The reduction in the intermediation cost leads to a surge in capital demand by firms, the deposit rate rises, and that drives up household savings substantially (panel e). The imposition of the credit subsidy to the capital-intensive industries further increases the demand for capital and results in even higher household savings, while its subsequent reduction after 2025 causes a decline in the household savings rate (panel g).
In terms of the per capita output growth rates, since the private labor-intensive firms are more productive than the other firms, the reduction in the credit tax on these firms should boost output growth. However, the associated lower savings discussed above 24 cancel out these positive effects and actually lead to slightly lower per capita output growth initially. The growth does pick up significantly after 1985 (Figure 10 panel b) .
The imposition of interest subsidies to state-owned labor-intensive firms mitigates the gains in output as the state firms are less productive than the private firms (Figure 10 panel d). The reduction in intermediation cost benefits firms in general as they now face a lower borrowing cost, and this benefits capital-intensive firms in particular. Output also rises in response (Figure 10 panel f) . Finally, credit subsidies to the capital-intensive heavy industries boost growth initially when they correct the inefficiency caused by the intermediation cost. Later, however, the credit subsidies distort capital allocation and depress growth (Figure 10 panel h ).
The Role of Endogenous Human Capital Investment
One unique feature of our model is the introduction of endogenous human capital investment. It allows households to save by investing in their children and affecting their expected old-age transfer payment from the children. In other words, with additional spending on children's education, a household can improve its children's labor efficiency and hence wage income. Since the old-age transfer from children to parents is proportional to the children's labor income, higher human capital investment means higher wages and hence higher transfer payments. At the aggregate level, human capital investment improves labor quality and drives growth. For savings, in the short run, households will save less for old age with endogenous human capital investment. In the long run, however, the additional income associated with human capital investment may lead them to save more with endogenous human capital investment than they would without endogenous human capital investment.
To quantitatively examine the importance of this margin, we conduct an experiment where we do not allow households to endogenously invest in human capital. Instead, we fix their human capital investment per child relative to income at the same ratio as in the initial steady state (which is shown in Figure 4 ) and solve the general equilibrium problem along the transition. In Figure 11 
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In this paper, we build a unified framework that brings together important changes on the households' as well as the firms' side of the Chinese economy to account for its rapid growth. On the household side, we focus on aging demographics arising from the onechild policy, increased life expectancy, and the reduced pension replacement rate. On the firm side, we focus on government credit policies that have favored different industries over time. Our model also features endogenous human capital investment that has been a prominent part of the Chinese growth experience.
Our analysis indicates both the demographic changes and the government policies played important roles in driving China's high rate of savings and fast growth. While the demographic changes did not take effect until the 1990s, the impact associated with government policies were much more immediate. This is particularly true for output growth. Importantly, though human capital investment in the short run crowds out capital investment and, hence, output growth, in the long run, it raises both savings and output growth substantially. To arrive at the per capita output growth, we first divide output-side real GDP at chained PPPs (2011 US$) by total population, take the growth rates, and then HP filter the series. The employment share by private enterprises is from Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2011). The relative size of fixed assets of heavy and light industry is from Chang, Chen, Waggoner, and Zha (2015). The heavy industry sector includes real estate, leasing and commercial service; electricity, heating and water production and supply; coking, coal gas and petroleum processing; wholesale, retail, accommodation and catering; banking and insurance; chemical; mining; transportation, information transmission and computer services and software. The light industry sector includes food, beverage and tobacco; other manufacturing; metal product; machinery equipment; construction material and nonmetallic mineral product; textile, garment and leather; construction; other services; and farming, forestry, animal husbandry and fishery (Table 11 
